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Webmaster
06-05-2007, 07:59 AM
Ruling on a King County case, justices overturn appeals court decision

LINDA GREENHOUSE; The New York TimesPublished: June 5th, 2007 01:00 AM
WASHINGTON – The Supreme Court strengthened the hand of prosecutors Monday in death penalty cases by making it easier to remove potential jurors who express ambivalence about the death penalty or confusion about how it should be applied.

The 5-4 decision – overturning an appeal of a King County case – instructed federal judges, in particular, to defer to the ruling of a state court trial judge who concludes that a potential juror should be disqualified as unable to give appropriate consideration to imposing the death penalty. “It is the trial court’s ruling that counts,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the majority.

The decision overturned a ruling by a conservative icon among federal appellate judges, Judge Alex Kozinski of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Kozinski’s majority opinion last June granted a writ of habeas corpus and ordered a new sentencing hearing for the defendant, Cal C. Brown.

In May 1991, Brown had carjacked 22-year-old Holly Washa and driven her to a motel. He held her for two days, periodically whipping and sexually assaulting her, before he slit her throat, stuffed her in a car trunk and left her to die in a parking lot.

Brown then flew to Palm Springs, where he tortured and raped a woman he’d met earlier, handcuffing her to a bed and slitting her throat. She survived.

A King County jury found Brown guilty of Washa’s murder and sentenced him to death.

Kozinski said the trial judge had improperly granted the prosecutor’s request to dismiss a juror who, while expressing some qualms about the death penalty, also said he would be willing to impose it in an “appropriate” case.

Writing for the four dissenters on Monday, Justice John Paul Stevens said the majority had erased an important distinction the Supreme Court had long drawn between “mere opposition to the death penalty” and “an inability to perform the legally required duties of a juror.” Stevens said the court’s precedents made it clear that no matter what a juror’s personal opinion about capital punishment, the juror should not be dismissed in the absence of evidence of unwillingness or inability to follow the law.

Stevens, joined in dissent by justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, underscored his disagreement by reading a portion of his opinion from the bench.

The 5-4 lineup Monday reflected the court’s recurring ideological divide. Last term, 12 cases were decided by 5-4. The 13 cases decided so far this year by one-vote margins almost certainly will grow before the court adjourns this month.

The remaining undecided cases include affirmative-action cases out of Kentucky and Washington state, which many court observers predict will come down to 5-4 votes. The court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program by 5-4 in 2003.

McClatchy Newspapers contributed to this report.

source: http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/nationworld/story/78636.html

Webmaster
06-05-2007, 08:00 AM
I don't understand this ruling:

“WASHINGTON – The Supreme Court strengthened the hand of prosecutors Monday in death penalty cases by making it easier to remove potential jurors who express ambivalence about the death penalty or confusion about how it should be applied.”

A definition of “ambivalence” found on the web is: “The coexistence of opposing or incompatible attitudes, needs, or interests in the same individuals, resulting in uncertainty about alternative courses of action.”

This ruling seems to suggest that if a potential juror is uncertain about how the death penalty should be applied, they may be dismissed as a juror. That brings up the question of how much difference is there between being "uncertain" about the death penalty to being "against" it?

The ruling seems to imply that, in the eyes of a prosecutor, if a potential juror is opposed to the death penalty, the potential juror can be removed from the jury. If my understanding is correct, and I'm not sure that it is, it sounds as this ruling has served to remove a big part of the concept of an impartial jury, at least in trials involving the death penalty.

The question that seems to need asking is: If the jury members must be in favor of the death penalty to be jury members, can the jury members still be impartial?

Can anyone clarify???